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Abstract: Using data from the most recent large scale UK household longitudinal survey 
(UKHLS), we explore the effects of political ideology on charitable behaviour, specifically 
monetary donations and time volunteered. The UKHLS contains detailed information on 
political preferences, in terms of: political affiliation; the strength of support for political 
parties; the level of interest in politics and the party an individual would vote for tomorrow. 
We employ a number of modelling frameworks including static and dynamic models and 
double hurdle models, which allow political influences to have differing effects across the 
decision to donate and the amount of money or time donated. The consistent finding across the 
different estimators is that being aligned to a stated political party is positively associated with 
donating time and money. In addition, we find that political liberalism has a larger effect on 
both types of philanthropic behaviour than political conservatism. The largest effects across 
specifications are generally for alignment with the Green Party. However, further analysis 
reveals that, during the period of the UK Coalition Government and after its collapse when the 
Conservative Party gained power, the effect of political affiliation to the Green Party on 
monetary donations is substantially reduced, whereas the opposite effect is found for the 
amount of time volunteered. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
We investigate the effect of political ideology on donating behaviour in the UK, in terms of the 
amount of money donated to charity and the amount of time volunteered. Recent figures from 
the Charities Aid Foundation (2016a) estimates total donations by adults in 2015 at £9.6 billion 
for the UK, whilst Giving USA (2016) estimate total charitable contributions in the U.S. in 
2015 at $373.25 billion. Hence, it is not surprising that an extensive economics literature on 
charitable donations exists, which has focused on the decision to donate money.1 Hours of 
unpaid labour volunteered by individuals in 2012 in the UK are estimated at 2.29 billion, 
equating to an average of around 8 hours per week worth £25.6 billion to the economy (ONS 
2013).2 However, in contrast to the literature on monetary donations, there is a much smaller 
body of research investigating the amount of time volunteered, i.e. the supply of unpaid labour. 
Contributions include Mencik and Weisbrod (1987), Freeman (1997) and Brown and Taylor 
(2018).3  
With respect to reasons why individuals choose to donate time and/or money, the 
economics literature has generally adopted a utility maximising framework, where utility is an 
increasing function of monetary donations to charity and/or time volunteered. It is possible to 
think of two primary mechanisms by which donating time or money may increase utility, with 
both operating through the impure altruistic motive. The first is warm glow, which arises as a 
feel good factor from donating, see Andreoni (1989, 1990) and Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), 
whilst the second operates through perceived social image, the prestige motive, whereby social 
                                                          
1
 Andreoni (2006) and Andreoni and Payne (2013) provide extensive surveys of the influences on charitable 
donations. Common findings are that monetary donations are influenced by income (Auten et al., 2002) and that 
they fluctuate over the lifecycle (Glenday et al., 1986). For the U.S., Mencik and Weisbrod (1987) found that, in 
common with monetary donations, price and income effects were important factors determining the number of 
hours of unpaid labour volunteered. Furthermore, the literature has also considered the impact of tax deductibility 
and the associated price and income effects, e.g. Bönke et al. (2013). 
2
 The figures are based on individuals who volunteer at least once per annum. 
3
 Whilst not the focus of this paper, a number of studies have also explored whether monetary and time donations 
are substitutes or complements, e.g. Bauer et al. (2013), Brown and Lankford (1992) and Brown and Taylor 
(2018), where findings generally support complementarity. 
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approval is sought by the individual, see Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2009) and Cappellari et al. (2011). 
We contribute to the small literature on the relationship between political ideology and 
charitable behaviour, where the evidence to date is predominantly for the U.S. and is mixed.4 
For the U.S., Brooks (2005, 2006) argues that political conservatism is an important factor in 
determining philanthropic behaviour. Indeed, his results show that politically conservative 
individuals are more likely to donate both time and money to charitable causes. He 
hypothesises that, in the U.S., this arises, as the factors likely to drive charitable behaviour, e.g. 
religion and attending religious services, are more consistent with the lifestyles and outlook of 
conservative rather than liberal individuals. Kaikati et al. (2017) analyse qualitative data at the 
individual level obtained from staff and students in a mid-western U.S. university. Their 
findings are consistent with Brooks (2005, 2006) indicating that conservatives tend to be more 
generous when facing a liberal audience than when making donating decisions in private. In 
contrast, Forbes and Zampelli (2013) and Yen and Zampelli (2014) report findings for the U.S. 
suggesting that liberals donate more than people with other political affiliations.5 Werfel (2018) 
uses a number of large-scale experiments in the U.S. to investigate whether government 
spending crowds out charitable giving. The analysis reveals that charitable giving can reduce 
support for government spending among liberal respondents. Moreover, he finds that liberals 
are more inclined to support those causes related to the arts, while moderates and conservatives 
are more likely to support human services.  
Other studies have found no statistically significant relationship between political 
affiliation and donations of time and/or money. For example, Forbes and Zampelli (2014) 
                                                          
4
 Although not directly related to the analysis herein, using a national sample of Catholic church donations per 
week in the U.S. at the parish level, Hungerman et al. (2018) find that a presidential campaign stop can increase 
total donations to the parish by around 2 percent. 
5
 In the context of the U.S. congress, Haas and Morton (2018) note that people expect liberals and democrats to 
be more generous, whilst conservatives and republicans are more moral. 
4 
analyse the decision to volunteer during the past year and find that the political identity of an 
individual, i.e. whether conservative or liberal, has no impact on the likelihood of volunteering. 
Luccasen et al. (2017) use a real donation experiment in the U.S. to explore links between 
contributions to poverty-relief charities and perceptions of federal transfers to low income 
households. They also ask participants to self-identify political affiliation and find that there is 
little correlation between political ideology and giving to charity.  
All of the aforementioned U.S. studies, which examine the role of political ideology, 
are based upon cross-section data or data from experiments, and are not able to account for 
unobserved individual specific effects.6 In contrast, we analyse a nationally representative 
panel dataset, Understanding Society, the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), to 
investigate the relationship between political ideology and charitable behaviour from an 
empirical perspective. We are aware of no other empirical study for the UK, which has analysed 
the relationship between political affiliation and charitable behaviour. Our econometric 
modelling strategy allows for the fact that donations of money and time are not continuous 
outcomes. Monetary donations are censored and the distribution of hours volunteered is a count 
outcome. Our estimation approach takes these aspects of the distributions into account. Both 
types of donating behaviour are modelled within a random effects framework allowing for 
individual specific effects. In addition, exploiting the longitudinal nature of our data, we 
estimate dynamic models of charitable behaviour to allow for the habitual aspect to donating 
behaviour. Given that a large number of individuals do not donate money to charity and/or 
volunteer time, we also estimate double-hurdle models to explore which part of the distribution, 
6
 Wiepking (2010) uses data from the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study, where respondents record their 
political values on a five-point scale from ‘very right’ through to ‘very left’ wing. She considers the likelihood of 
giving to a large number of different types of charitable organisations. Using a conditional logit framework, she 
finds that those individuals with political tendencies aligned towards the left have a higher probability of donating 
to international organisations and a lower probability of donating from door-to-door solicitation. There are no 
significant effects of political alignment to the left on the probability of donating to charitable causes, which are 
faith based, or which have a focus on: children; culture; community/welfare; health/disability; and 
environment/animal protection. 
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if any, political affiliation influences, i.e. the probability of undertaking charitable behaviour 
and/or the non-zero amount of money/time donated. Finally, we investigate the effect of the 
political party in power when the individual was interviewed as our sample covers three 
periods: when the Labour Party was in power, the subsequent Coalition Liberal Democrat-
Conservative Government, and, most recently, the Conservative Government. We explore 
whether the association between political affiliation and donating behaviour varies over the 
different periods of government. In what follows, Section 2 introduces the data used in the 
analysis, Section 3 describes the empirical methodology, the results are presented and 
discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
We use data from Understanding Society, the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), 
to investigate the relationship between political ideology and the proportion of annual income 
donated to charity over the past year and the number of hours of unpaid labour volunteered 
during the last four weeks. The UKHLS is designed to capture life in the UK and how it is 
changing over time.7 Participants live in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England. The 
survey contains information about people’s social and economic circumstances, attitudes, 
behaviours and health. In the first wave, over 50,000 individuals were interviewed between 
2009 and 2011. Correspondingly, in the latest available wave (wave 8) over 39,000 individuals 
were interviewed between 2016 and 2018. Interviews for waves 2, 4 and 6 contain information 
on the monetary amount donated to charity over the last twelve months and the number of 
hours volunteered during the past four weeks. In addition, there are a number of questions 
relating to political ideology.8 We construct an unbalanced panel of individuals over the three 
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 The survey builds on its predecessor, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which covered the period 
1991 to 2008. 
8
 Although wave 8 also contains information on charitable donations of time and money, it does not contain 
questions regarding political ideology. 
6 
 
waves, where the sample size comprises 28,142 individuals aged 16 and over, who are observed 
between 1 and 3 times yielding total observations of 62,228.  
With respect to political ideology, initially individuals are asked in the interview 
whether they support a particular political party and if they feel closer to one party in particular. 
If the individual responds ‘yes’ to either of the aforementioned questions, they are then asked: 
to state which political party they are closest to as well as the strength of support for the stated 
political party. Those individuals who do not support a political party or do not feel close to 
any one particular group are asked to state the political party that they would vote for tomorrow. 
Finally, all individuals are asked to state their level of interest in politics. Our sample covers 
England only and the following political parties: Conservative; Labour; Liberal Democrats; 
and the Green Party.9 
We estimate models of the amount of money donated to charity in the past 12 months 
as a proportion of the individual’s annual total income (from employment, benefits and other 
sources), and we also model the number of hours volunteered during the last four weeks. Each 
outcome is conditioned on an extensive set of socio-economic covariates, ࢄ௜௧, as well as 
information on political ideology, ࡼ࡭௜௧. The modelling approach is detailed in Section 3 below.  
The set of covariates included in ࢄ௜௧ is informed by the existing literature and includes 
the following: Gender; ethnicity; age, specifically aged 16-24, aged 25-34, aged 35-44, aged 
45-54 and aged 55-64 (over 65 is the reference category); the number of children in the 
household aged 2 or under, aged between 3-4, aged 5-11 and aged 12-15; the number of adults 
in the household; married or cohabiting; highest educational qualification, i.e. degree 
(undergraduate or postgraduate), other higher qualification (e.g. teaching or nursing), 
Advanced (A) level, General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), where no education 
                                                          
9
 For the analysis, only these four political parties are consistently available in each wave. 
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is the omitted category;10 the natural logarithm of monthly labour income; the natural logarithm 
of monthly non-labour income; the natural logarithm of monthly savings; labour force status, 
specifically employed, self-employed, or unemployed (all other labour market states constitute 
the reference category);11 housing tenure, whether the home is owned outright, owned via a 
mortgage or privately rented (all other types of tenure make up the omitted category); whether 
the individual attends religious services once a month or more frequently (with less than once 
a month and never as the omitted category); religious denomination, Church of England, 
Roman Catholic, other Christian, Muslim, or other religion (no religion is the reference 
category). We also control for self-reported health status, specifically excellent health, good 
health or fair health (with poor and very poor health as the reference category); measures of 
cognitive ability,12 specifically word recall (respondents were asked to remember a list of 10 
words and repeat them back to the interviewer immediately),13 numeric ability (a series of short 
number puzzles to measure the use of numbers in everyday life),14 verbal fluency (the number 
of animals that the respondent can correctly name in a minute); the Big Five personality traits,15 
i.e. agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and openness to experience. 
The final set of controls are eleven region of residence controls (with London as the reference 
category) and wave controls.  
Summary statistics are given in Table 1A for the dependent variables, where Panel A 
focuses on the amount donated to charity as a proportion of total income and Panel B focuses 
                                                          
10
 GCSE level qualifications are taken after eleven years of formal compulsory schooling and approximate to the 
U.S. honours high school curriculum. The A level qualification is a public examination taken by 18 year olds over 
a two-year period studying between one to four subjects and is the main determinant of eligibility for entry to 
higher education in the UK. 
11
 This includes retirement, family care, full time students and the long-term sick or disabled. 
12
 The measures of cognitive skill are standardised to mean zero and unit standard deviation. 
13
 For full details of the tests, see McFall (2013). 
14
 A similar test of cognitive ability has been used by Banks et al. (2010). 
15
 To mitigate against the potential problem of life cycle effects influencing personality traits and the subsequent 
measurement error this might induce, following the existing literature, we condition each personality trait on a 
polynomial in age. The resulting residuals are standardised (zero mean and unit standard deviation) and used as 
indicators of personality traits net of life cycle influences (see, for example, Nyhus and Pons, 2005, Brown and 
Taylor, 2014, and Aidt and Rauh, 2018).  
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on the number of hours volunteered.16 The top part of Panel A reports the descriptive statistics 
for all individuals regardless of whether they make a monetary donation to charity. The average 
monetary amount donated to charitable causes during the past year is £161. Charitable 
donations over the past year as a proportion of annual income are, on average, low, at around 
1%. It can be seen from Table 1A Panel A that around 68% of the sample made a monetary 
donation to charity during the past year. Based on donators only, the proportion of annual 
income donated to charity increases to 1.5%, see final row of Table 1A Panel A. Turning to the 
number of hours of unpaid labour volunteered, the top part of Panel B reports the descriptive 
statistics. Across all individuals, the average number of hours volunteered over the last four 
weeks is just under 2 hours 30 minutes. It can be seen from Table 1A Panel B that around 16% 
of the sample volunteered over the last month. The number of hours volunteered amongst those 
who volunteer is, on average, 15, see final row of Table 1A Panel B. Figures 1 and 2 show the 
distributions of the two dependent variables for those who donate to charity and volunteers, 
respectively.  
In Table 1B, summary statistics are provided for the explanatory variables, where 
around 44% are male, 39% are aged between 35 and 54, 24% have a degree as their highest 
level of educational attainment, over 70% own their house either outright or with a mortgage, 
around 19% of individuals attend a religious service at least once a month and the average level 
of monthly labour (non-labour) income equates to £1,413 (£708) and monthly savings are £129. 
 Table 1C provides summary statistics relating to the main covariates of interest, i.e. 
political affiliation, ࡼ࡭௜௧, where the labour party is characterised by the highest proportion of 
individuals responding that they feel closest to this party at 27%. The final two columns of the 
table provide correlation coefficients between each political affiliation variable and the two 
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 All monetary variables are deflated to 2009 constant prices. 
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outcome variables of interest, where some differences across political party affiliation are 
apparent.17  
3. Methodology 
We model charitable donations as a proportion of income denoted by ݀݋݊௜௧ as a censored 
outcome via a random effects tobit specification, as is common in the literature (e.g. Andreoni 
and Payne, 2013), across individuals ݅ = 1,2,  ,28142 and time ݐ = 1,2,3 as follows: ݀݋݊௜௧כ = ࢄ௜௧ᇱ ࢼ + ࡼ࡭௜௧ᇱ ࢽ + ߙ௜ + ߳௜௧       (1a) ݀݋݊௜௧ = max[0,݀݋݊௜௧כ ]        (1b) 
where ࢄ௜௧ is a vector of covariates, ࡼ࡭௜௧ is a vector of political affiliation variables, ߙ௜ is an 
individual specific random error and ߳௜௧ is a white noise error term. Following Brown and 
Taylor (2018), when modelling the number of hours volunteered, ݒ݋݈௜௧, we treat this as a count 
outcome and adopt an exponential functional form, where the expected value of volunteering 
conditional on the covariates is given as: ܧ[ݒ݋݈௜௧|ࢄ௜௧,ࡼ࡭௜௧,ߙ௜] = exp(ࢄ௜௧ᇱ ࢼ + ࡼ࡭௜௧ᇱ ࢽ + ߨ௜)     (2a) 
where ߨ௜ = log(ߙ௜). Assuming that volunteering has a Poisson distribution with expectation ߣ௜௧ = exp(ࢄ௜௧ᇱ ࢼ + ࡼ࡭௜௧ᇱ ࢽ + ߨ௜)       (2b) 
then the probability mass function of ݒ݋݈௜௧ conditional on the covariates and individual specific 
effect is given as follows: 
prob{ݒ݋݈௜௧ = ݒ|ࢄ௜௧,ࡼ࡭௜௧,ߙ௜} = exp(െߣ௜௧)ߣ௜௧௩ ݒ!Τ      (2c) 
For both outcomes, the key parameters of interest are given in the vector ࢽ in terms of whether 
the political affiliation variables: (i) have a positive (or negative) effect on monetary donations 
                                                          
17
 Amongst those individuals who state the political party they feel closest to, 13% switch party affiliation over 
the sample period. The highest (lowest) percentage of switching political party alignment is for Labour (Green) 
Party at 7% (2%). Considering all individuals, 34% switch from having no party affiliation to feeling aligned to a 
stated party (where the dominant category is the Labour Party). These patterns and the relative stability of political 
preferences are consistent with the evidence provided in Aidt and Rauh (2018). 
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and/or time volunteered; and (ii) are larger for political conservatives, as found by Brooks 
(2006), or for liberals, as reported by Yen and Zampelli (2013).  
For both dependent variables (see Table 1A), there are a large number of individuals 
who do not donate money and/or volunteer. Hence, we also model donations and volunteering 
using a double-hurdle approach following Cragg (1971). Specifically, we model the two part-
process of the distribution in order to assess the following: (i) whether the political affiliation 
covariates only affect the probability of donating money (volunteering time); (ii) whether the 
political affiliation variables are only associated with the proportion of income donated to 
charity (number of hours volunteered) conditional on donating (volunteering); or (iii) whether 
the political affiliation variables are associated with both parts of the distribution, i.e. the 
probability (selection) and the amount (the outcome, i.e. money or time). The hurdle model is 
defined by the relationship ௜ܻ௧ = ( ௜ܵ௧ × ௜ܻ௧כ), where ௜ܻ௧ is the observed outcome of the 
dependent variable, i.e. the proportion of income donated to charity, ݀݋݊௜௧, or the amount of 
time volunteered, ݒ݋݈௜௧: 
௜ܵ௧ = 1(ࢄଵ௜௧ᇱ ࢼଵ + ࡼ࡭௜௧ᇱ ࢽଵ + ߝଵ௜௧ > 0)      (3a) ௜ܻ௧כ  = ࢄଶ௜௧ᇱ ࢼଶ + ࡼ࡭௜௧ᇱ ࢽଶ + ߝଶ௜௧       (3b) 
The selection variable, ௜ܵ௧, equals one if the dependent variable is not bounded (i.e. the 
individual donates money or volunteers time and is zero otherwise), where ࢄଵ௜௧ is a vector of 
covariates, which influence the probability of making a monetary donation or volunteering 
time. The continuous outcome is a latent variable ௜ܻ௧כ  and is observed only if ௜ܵ௧ = 1, i.e. if the 
individual donates money or volunteers. For the proportion of income donated to charity, the 
outcome equation (3b) is a linear model, whilst, for the number of hours volunteered, equation 
(3b) is exponential, where ࢄଶ௜௧ is a vector of explanatory variables associated with this part of 
the distribution.18  
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 In the double hurdle framework, the standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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To identify the model, following Pudney (1989) and Yen and Zampelli (2014), we enter 
the budget constraint variables, namely income and savings, only in the outcome equation (3b). 
In a similar vein, following existing literature, see Ben-Ner et al. (2004a,b), Hauser (2000) and 
James (2011), which suggests that cognitive skills and personality traits influence the 
probability of engaging in charitable behaviour, we enter cognitive skills and personality traits 
only in the selection equation (3a).19 In addition, there are common control variables in ࢄଵ௜௧ 
and ࢄଶ௜௧, as defined above in Section 2.20 The parameters of particular interest are ࢽଵ and ࢽଶ 
in terms of the sign, statistical significance, and the respective magnitudes. 
4. Results 
The results discussion is organised into three sub-sections. Firstly, we focus on the relationship 
between political affiliation and the amount of money donated and time volunteered, estimating 
random effects tobit and count models, respectively. Secondly, we explicitly model the 
donating decision and the amount of money/time donated via a double hurdle approach, which 
allows for the two-part nature of the distribution of charitable behaviour. Finally, we explore 
the impact of the changes in government, which occurred over the sample period, on the 
association between political affiliation and charitable behaviour.  
4.1. The amount of money and time donated 
Table 2 presents the results from modelling both monetary donations (first column) and time 
volunteered (second column), conditional on the covariates in ࢄ௜௧, and which political party 
the individual feels closest to, ࡼ࡭௜௧. Monetary donations are modelled via a random effects 
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 For example, Ben-Ner et al. (2004a,b) found that personality traits are associated with a higher probability of 
donating. With respect to cognitive skills, Hauser (2000) showed an association between volunteering and verbal 
proficiency, whilst James (2011) found that higher cognitive ability was associated with a higher probability of 
charitable giving. 
20
 It is important to acknowledge that the tobit and the count models detailed above include zero and non zero 
values in the estimations. The findings indicate whether the explanatory variables influence the expected value of 
the dependent variable, which could be operating at zero and/or positive values of the dependent variable. In 
contrast, the double hurdle approach allows us to evaluate the effects at the two different parts of the distribution 
of the dependent variable. 
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tobit estimator with marginal effects reported,21 whilst hours volunteered are based upon a 
random effects Poisson count model with coefficients reported.22 Before focusing on the 
political variables of interest, we briefly discuss how other covariates are associated with 
donations of time and money. 
The age effects are consistent with the evidence reported in the existing literature, such 
as Lankford and Wyckoff (1991), Auten and Joulfaian (1996) and Schokkaert (2006) for 
monetary donations, and Mencik and Weisbrod (1987) and Freeman (1997) for volunteering 
time. As commonly found in the literature, being male is inversely associated with donations 
as  a proportion of income and hours volunteered, at approximately 50 per cent and 17 per cent 
lower than females, respectively. For time volunteered, the composition of the family is 
important, where having children aged 2 or under is inversely associated with hours 
volunteered. Indeed, individuals with children in this age group volunteer 58 per cent fewer 
hours relative to individuals without dependent children. Increasing levels of educational 
attainment have a positive monotonic relationship with both the proportion of income donated 
to charity and the number of hours volunteered, which is consistent with the findings in the 
existing literature, see, for example, Schokkaert (2006) and Cappellari et al. (2011).  
In terms of the monetary controls, we find that the effects of labour, non-labour income 
and monthly savings are generally statistically significant yet inelastic, which is consistent with 
the findings of Auten et al. (2002) for monetary donations. The share of income donated to 
charitable causes is inversely associated with the level of income (from both labour and non-
labour sources). This finding accords with the existing literature, see, for example, List (2011), 
and the recent evidence from the Charities Aid Foundation (2016a) UK Giving report, which 
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 These marginal effects are based on the expected value of the dependent variable (for both censored and 
uncensored observations), given a vector of covariates and parameters, for a unit change in a covariate. 
22
 Focusing on the number of hours volunteered, omitting subscripts from equation (2) for brevity, and defining ࢝ = (ࢄԢ,ࡼ࡭Ԣ)Ԣ, ࣘ = (ࢼ,ࢽ), then adding 1 to the kth independent variable in ࢝ (i.e., a unit change), the functional 
form of the model implies: ா{௩௢௟|࢝,(௪ೖାଵ),ఢ}ா{௩௢௟|࢝,௪ೖ,ఢ} = ா{௩௢௟|௪భ,௪మ,,(௪ೖାଵ),ఢ}ா{௩௢௟|௪భ,௪మ,,௪ೖ,ఢ} = exp(߶௞). Given that the outcome of interest 
is a count variable, the normalized effect exp(߶௞) is the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) for a one-unit change in ݓ௞. 
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suggests that those individuals with a lower income, such as the retired, contribute to charity 
out of accumulated wealth rather than their current income. However, labour and non-labour 
income have opposing effects on time volunteered, where a 1% increase in labour (non-labour) 
income decreases (increases) the time spent volunteering by 2.4 (2.3) per cent. Monthly savings 
are positively associated with both types of charitable behaviour, increasing the proportion of 
income donated to charity by around 9 per cent and the number of hours of unpaid labour 
volunteered by just under 3 per cent. 
With respect to labour market status, being self-employed or employed is positively 
associated with the proportion of income donated to charity as compared to those not in the 
labour force (predominately retirees). Conversely, when focusing on donations of time, not 
surprisingly being employed is associated with fewer hours volunteered relative to those not in 
the labour market, which potentially reflects the opportunity cost of time in that employees’ 
leisure hours are likely to be more constrained, see Freeman (1997). In accordance with the 
existing U.S. literature, such as Feldman (2010), homeownership, explicitly stating a religious 
denomination, or being an active member of a religious group are all positively associated with 
donations of money and time. This latter finding is consistent with Bauer et al. (2013), who 
jointly model the probability of making a monetary donation and volunteering time for a group 
of European countries. Their analysis reveals that being a church member positively influences 
the likelihood of undertaking both types of charitable behaviour.  
The measures of cognitive ability are found to be positively associated with the 
proportion of income given to charitable causes, which is consistent with James (2011). 
Interestingly, numeric cognitive ability has the largest effect in terms of magnitude, which 
might reflect the possibility that such individuals may more accurately predict future lifetime 
income and, hence, may be more willing and prone to donate to charity. With respect to the 
Big Five personality traits, agreeableness, extraversion and openness to experience are all 
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positively related to the proportion of annual income donated to charitable causes. 
Conscientiousness is inversely related to charitable donations and volunteering, which is 
consistent with the results of Donnelly et al. (2012), who report that highly conscientious 
individuals are more able to manage their money through greater levels of financial self-
control.  
 We now turn to the main variables of interest associated with political affiliation. In 
accordance with results for the U.S. from Yen and Zampelli (2014), our findings are not in line 
with the hypothesis put forward by Brooks (2005, 2006) that political conservatives are more 
charitable than liberals.23 In terms of the magnitude of the estimated parameters, we find the 
following effects for each political party. Compared to not supporting a specific political party 
or not feeling closer to any one party, we find that feeling closest to the Green Party is 
associated with donating approximately 73 per cent more of annual income to charitable causes 
and volunteering 54 per cent more hours. Being affiliated with the Liberal Democrats, in 
comparison to not supporting a specific political party, is associated with donating around 48 
per cent more of their annual income to charity and volunteering 35 per cent more hours. The 
corresponding figures for Conservatives are also positive, although much smaller at 37 per cent 
and 22 per cent, respectively. Finally, the smallest effects are found for being aligned with the 
Labour Party, where, compared to not stating support for a specific party, the respective 
magnitudes fall to 32 per cent and 18 per cent. These effects relating to political affiliation 
remain after including a large number of controls such as religion and frequency of attending 
religious services, which are likely to be related to political outlook, see Brooks (2006).24 
                                                          
23
 It is debatable how comparable the results herein are to the U.S. literature, due to differences in the political 
system and that on average U.S. and European citizens differ when it comes to policy preferences, with the former 
being more conservative, e.g. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Luttmer and Singhal (2011). 
24
 We have been careful to refer to associations rather than causal relationships. In particular, political affiliation 
may be endogenous due to reverse causation with donating behaviour. We have explored whether our results hold 
under a more stringent conditioning framework accounting for potential endogeneity bias. The UKHLS contains 
some households with two or more generations of adults. By focusing on a sample of young adults (aged 16 or 
above), we model their donating behaviour on their political affiliation, which has been instrumented by whether 
their parents changed their political affiliation between waves. The results for a sample of 1,800 children (2,235 
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The results presented so far are based on a static panel estimation framework. Following 
Wooldridge (2005), we examine the robustness of the political affiliation effects in a dynamic 
version of the model, i.e. where a lagged dependent variable is included, given that charitable 
behaviour may be habitual (e.g. Meer, 2013). The regression model is of the form:  
௜ܻ௧ = ߰ ௜ܻ௧ିଵ + ࢄ௜௧ᇱ ࢼ + ࡼ࡭௜௧ᇱ ࢽ + ߙ௜ + ߳௜௧   ߙ௜ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵ ௜ܻ଴ + ࢄഥ௜ᇱ࣊ + ߱௜ 
where ௜ܻ௧ is the outcome of interest (i.e. the proportion of income donated to charity, ݀݋݊௜௧, or 
the amount volunteered, ݒ݋݈௜௧). The individual specific effect ߙ௜ is conditioned on the initial 
state, ௜ܻ଴, i.e. the amount donated (time or money) when first observed in the panel, and the 
group means of time varying covariates, ࢄഥ௜.25 State dependence is ascertained in terms of the 
statistical significance of ௜ܻ௧ିଵ and the magnitude of ߰.  
The results are shown in Table 3, which is structured in the same way as Table 2, where, 
for brevity, only the lagged dependent variable and political affiliation variables are shown. 
There is clear evidence of persistence in charitable giving of money and time, which is 
consistent with the findings of Smith et al. (1995), Rosen and Sims (2011) and Meer (2013). 
Moreover, the effects of the political party the individual feels closest to remain in terms of the 
statistical significance and magnitude of the effects. Affiliation with the Green Party and 
affiliation with the Liberal Democrats have the largest positive effects on donating behaviour 
relative to those who do not state an affiliation. This is consistent with the fact that many views 
of these two parties are complementary, i.e. they compete for voters of a similar profile (see 
Birch, 2009). Affiliation with the Conservative Party and affiliation with the Labour Party have 
smaller effects on donating behaviour, but these remain positive relative to having no stated 
                                                          
observations), matched to their parents, reveals that, relative to no party affiliation, the effects of being affiliated 
to the Green Party and Liberal Party have the dominant effects on both donations of time and money, which is 
consistent with the above findings.  
25
 Wooldridge (2005) shows that this framework is appropriate for a number of non-linear estimators. 
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political affiliation. In summary, when accounting for dynamics in donating behaviour, relative 
to those who do not state a political affiliation, having an alignment to a particular party remains 
positive and statistically significant as found in the static model. Finally, the effects of Labour 
Party affiliation are larger than those of Conservative Party affiliation, relative to those who do 
not express a political affiliation. 
We now further explore the robustness of our findings related to the political affiliation 
variables. In Table 4 Panels A to D, we examine: (i) the strength of support for the stated 
political party; (ii) the sample of individuals who do not state a political affiliation but who 
state the party they would vote for tomorrow; (iii) the level of interest that the individual has 
in politics; and (iv) the political party they feel closest to interacted with their level of interest 
in politics.26 Considering Table 4 Panel A, in comparison to individuals who do not state 
support for a political party, the effects on donating behaviour of being affiliated with the Green 
Party or the Liberal Democrats are still greater than the corresponding effects of being affiliated 
with the Labour Party or the Conservatives. However, surprisingly, the degree of support does 
not uniformly have a monotonic effect on the level of charitable behaviour across political 
parties. For example, the largest effects for those who feel closest to the Conservative Party are 
for individuals who do not have very strong support for the party. In contrast, for the Liberal 
Democrats, the strength of support for the party has a positive monotonic effect on donations 
of both time and money, which is increasing in the level of support. 
In Table 4 Panel B, we focus on the sub-sample of 15,355 individuals who state that 
they do not support a political party and do not feel close to any one particular group. These 
individuals are asked to state the political party that they would vote for tomorrow. Consistent 
with the evidence presented so far, the analysis of this sub-sample reveals that the largest effects 
                                                          
26
 Given that allowing for dynamics did not alter our findings, we return to the static framework for the additional 
robustness analysis. 
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on both donations of time and money stem from those individuals who would vote for the 
Liberal Democrats and the Green Party compared to individuals who would not vote tomorrow 
or do not state who they would vote for. In general, these effects are positive with the exception 
of those who would vote for the Labour Party tomorrow and time volunteered. Interestingly, 
there is no association between whether the individual would vote for the Conservative Party 
tomorrow and the amount of time donated. 
Returning to the full sample, we now focus on the level of interest that the individual 
has in politics. The results in Table 4 Panel C suggest an increasing positive monotonic 
relationship with both types of charitable behaviour for the level of interest that the individual 
states that they have in politics, relative to having no interest at all. In Panel D, we interact the 
level of interest that the individual states they have in politics with the party that they feel 
closest to. For each political party, the magnitude of the association with donations of time and 
money increases with the level of interest in politics, relative to those individuals who do not 
state an alignment to a political party. For example, focusing on the Conservative Party, for the 
proportion of income donated to charity (time volunteered) and, for those who are not very 
interested, fairly interested or very interested in politics, the increase in donations is 30, 40 and 
60 per cent, respectively (21, 24 and 42 per cent, respectively), relative to not stating a political 
affiliation. The positive effects are particularly large for being very interested in politics and 
supporting the Green Party or the Liberal Democrats relative to having no political affiliation. 
These effects are larger than the comparable figures for either the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party.27 
                                                          
27
 The above models were re-estimated conditioning donations (of time or money) at time t on the political 
affiliation variables measured in the previous wave, i.e. t-1. Conditioning on lagged political affiliation helps to 
mitigate the potential for reverse causality since, as argued by Angrist and Pischke (2009). The political affiliation 
variables now predate the outcome variable of interest. The results were essentially unchanged from the analysis 
reported in Tables 2 to 4. However, given the wording associated with the political affiliation questions, we 
interpret these as the respondent’s current view (which may change over time) and, hence, prefer the 
contemporaneous specifications. Moreover, the introduction of lags reduces the length of the panel. 
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4.2. Modelling the two parts of the distribution – the double hurdle approach 
Given that a large proportion of the sample do not make a monetary donation to charity and/or 
do not volunteer any hours of unpaid labour, as can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, we also 
estimate double hurdle models following Yen and Zampelli (2014). This allows us to explicitly 
model both parts of the distribution, where we allow the political variables to influence both 
the probability of donating, i.e. the hurdle, and the amount donated. The results are shown in 
Tables 5 and 6 for monetary and time donations, respectively. Each table has three columns 
reporting: (1) overall average marginal effects; (2) results for the hurdle, where coefficients 
and average marginal effects for the probability of donating are given; and (3) coefficients for 
the outcome, i.e. amount (money or time) conditional on donating. This approach allows us to 
compare the magnitudes of the effects of political affiliation across both the selection and the 
outcome, where the overall average marginal effect is a combination of the two respective parts 
of the model. Omitting ݅ and ݐ subscripts, this is given by: 
 ߲ܧ(ܻ|ࢄ,ࡼ࡭) ߲ݔ௞Τ = ߲{prob(ܵ = 1|ࢄଵ,ࡼ࡭) × ܧ(ܻ|ܻ > 0, ࢄଶ,ࡼ࡭)} ߲ݔ௞Τ ,  
where the numerator is the derivative of the conditional mean. Each table is split into five 
panels, where Panel: (A) focuses on the party the individual is closest to; (B) relates to the 
strength of support for the stated political party; (C) focuses on the sub-sample of individuals 
who do not state a political affiliation but who state the party the individual would vote for 
tomorrow; (D) explores the level of interest in politics; and (E) explores the interaction between 
the level of interest in politics and the political party the individual feels closest to.  
Table 5 shows the results of the hurdle model of charitable donations as a proportion of 
total income. Panel A presents overall marginal effects, which are very similar in terms of 
magnitude to those in Table 2 Panel A, where the outcome was modelled via a random effects 
tobit estimator. These similarities highlight the robustness of our findings. It is apparent that, 
in general, for each political party, the largest effect is on the hurdle part of the distribution, i.e. 
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the decision to donate money, rather than the outcome, i.e. the proportion of income donated. 
The exception is for those who feel closest to the Green Party, where the coefficient is larger 
for the proportion of income donated to charity conditional on giving. Feeling closest to the 
Conservative (Green) Party is associated with a 7.7 (10.6) per cent higher probability of making 
a monetary donation and, conditional on donating, these individuals give 15 (60) per cent more 
income to charitable causes than individuals who are not aligned to any particular party. In 
terms of the strength of support for the stated political party, Panel B presents the overall 
marginal effects. There is a monotonic relationship with the proportion of income donated to 
charity as the level of support increases. This would appear to stem from the effect on the 
outcome rather than selection into donating behaviour, i.e. comparing the magnitude of the 
coefficients between columns 2 and 3.  
For those individuals who do not state a preference for any political party, but are asked 
who they would vote for tomorrow, the analysis from Panel C reveals that voting for the Liberal 
Party or the Green Party is positively associated with the amount donated as a proportion of 
income relative to those individuals who would not vote tomorrow. These effects are larger 
than the corresponding estimates found for the Conservative party. Consistent with the findings 
from Table 5 Panel A, the largest effects in terms of magnitude, when comparing coefficients 
across the two parts of the distribution, stem from the hurdle, i.e. donating money, rather than 
the outcome, i.e. the proportion of income donated conditional on donating (see Panel C). The 
level of interest that an individual has in politics has a positive association with donating 
behaviour, increasing monotonically in the level of interest (consistent with the evidence from 
the tobit analysis shown in Table 2), where again the dominant effect stems from the decision 
to donate, as can be seen from Panel D by comparing columns 2 and 3. Finally, Panel E reveals 
that, for each political party, across both parts of the distribution, the magnitude of the 
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association with donations of money increases with the level of interest in politics, relative to 
those individuals who do not state an alignment to a political party. 
The double hurdle analysis for hours volunteered is shown in Table 6. In contrast to the 
positive association between political affiliation and monetary donations revealed across both 
parts of the distribution, i.e. on the probability of giving money and the proportion of income 
donated, in Table 5, the analysis of hours volunteered reveals opposing effects on the two parts 
of the distribution. Throughout each panel of Table 6, it can be seen that stating a political 
affiliation is positively associated with the probability of volunteering time, but reduces the 
number of hours volunteered (conditional on being a volunteer). For example, considering the 
political party an individual feels closest to (see Panel A), the overall marginal effects are 
positive, which is consistent with the analysis of Tables 2 to 4 and are larger for affiliation with 
the Liberal Democrats compared to affiliation with the Conservatives (indeed the overall effect 
is insignificant for the latter). Feeling closest to the Conservative (Liberal Democrat) Party is 
associated with being 2.4 (5.7) per cent more likely to volunteer relative to those not stating a 
political affiliation. However, conditional on providing unpaid labour, affiliation with the 
Conservatives is associated with volunteering around 12 per cent fewer hours than individuals 
who do not state an affiliation to a political party.  
Turning to the strength of support for the stated party, see Table 6 Panel B, with the 
exception of being aligned with the Conservatives, the dominant category for the overall effect 
and the hurdle is for ‘very strong support’ (see columns 1 and 2). For the outcome part of the 
distribution, i.e. the number of hours volunteered, conditional on donating time, it is perhaps 
not surprising that expressing ‘not very strong support’ is associated with the largest negative 
effect on the amount of time donated. For the subset of the sample not stating support for any 
political party but who indicate the political party that they would vote for tomorrow, the only 
significant overall effect relates to the Labour Party with negative effects on both the 
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probability of volunteering and the amount of time given. Finally, considering the level of 
interest in politics (see Panels D and E), greater interest in politics has an overall positive 
influence on time volunteered and this stems from selection into volunteering behaviour. 
4.3. Changes in Government, political affiliation and donating behaviour 
In this sub-section, we investigate whether changes in government over the period of our 
sample influenced the relationship between political party alignment and donating behaviour. 
On 6th May 2010, a general election was held in the UK where prior to this date the Labour 
Party had been in power since 1997. After 11th May 2010, a coalition government was formed 
between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrat Party. The coalition agreement lasted 
for five years ending on 7th May 2015 when the Conservatives gained power replacing the 
Coalition Government. We adopt the following modelling framework to explore whether the 
political party in power affects the relationship between charitable behaviour and political party 
affiliation: 
௜ܻ௧ = ࢄ௜௧ᇱ ࢼ + ߜଵܿ݋݈ܽ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜௧ + ߜଶܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݎݒܽݐ݅ݒ݁௜௧ + σ ߨ௞ܲܣ௞௜௧ଷ௞ୀଵ +  σ ߶௞(ܲܣ௞௜௧ × ܿ݋݈ܽ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜௧)ଷ௞ୀଵ + σ ߠ௞(ܲܣ௞௜௧ × ܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݎݒܽݐ݅ݒ݁௜௧)ଷ௞ୀଵ + ߙ௜ + ߳௜௧   
where ௜ܻ௧ is the outcome of interest, i.e. the proportion of income donated to charity, ݀݋݊௜௧, or 
the number of hours volunteered, ݒ݋݈௜௧, modelled via a tobit or count estimator, respectively, 
incorporating random effects. We focus on individuals who state a political party affiliation in 
order to link political affiliation with the government in power. The sample is reduced to 18,832 
individuals (37,215 observations) who state a political party affiliation, where the reference 
category is feeling affiliated to the Labour Party.28 The following binary indicators are 
constructed: ܿ݋݈ܽ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜௧ = 1, if the date that the individual was interviewed on was after 11th 
May 2010 but before 7th May 2015 (i.e. the period of the Coalition Government, 85.3% of the 
                                                          
28
 The interpretation of the results is different to the previous analysis since the reference category has changed. 
We have selected affiliation with the Labour Party as the reference category as the Labour Party was in power at 
the start of our period of analysis. 
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sample were interviewed during this window), and ܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݎݒܽݐ݅ݒ݁௜௧ = 1 if the individual was 
interviewed after 7th May 2015 (7.9% of the sample were interviewed during this window). 
Hence, the reference period is when the Labour Party was in office, which corresponds to 6.8% 
of the sample. We also define political party affiliation controls: ܲܣଵ = 1 if the individual 
identifies as being more closely affiliated to the Conservative Party; ܲܣଶ = 1 if the individual 
identifies as being more closely affiliated to the Liberal Democrat Party; and ܲܣଷ = 1 if the 
individual identifies as being more closely affiliated to the Green Party. During the period of 
the Labour Government, the role of political affiliation is ascertained by each of the ߨ 
parameters (all relative to being affiliated to the Labour Party). During the period of the 
Coalition Government, the effect of affiliation to the Conservative (Liberal Democrat) Party is 
given by ߨଵ + ߶ଵ (ߨଶ + ߶ଶ), relative to being affiliated to the Labour Party. The corresponding 
effects for when the Conservative Party came into government are given by ߨଵ + ߠଵ (ߨଶ + ߠଶ). 
 The results of the empirical analysis are shown in Table 7, which is structured in the 
same way as Table 2, with the first column focusing on the proportion of income donated to 
charity and the second column focusing on the number of unpaid hours of labour volunteered. 
Additional controls include binary indicators for the day, month and year of interview. The 
change in government appears to have no direct statistically significant effect on monetary 
donations as the null hypothesis that ߜଵ = 0 and ߜଶ = 0 cannot be rejected. Conversely, time 
spent volunteering is positively associated with the Coalition Government and the 
Conservative Government being in power compared to the period when the Labour Party was 
in power. Considering the differential effects of political affiliation during the period of the 
coalition agreement and the period of the Conservative Government, some interesting findings 
emerge. Whilst the joint parameter tests are significant for each party affiliation during the 
Coalition Government, the only significant individual differential effect is for the Green Party. 
Specifically, compared to those people who are aligned to the Labour Party, during the period 
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of the Labour Government, feeling closest to the Green Party is associated with donating 
approximately 182 per cent more of annual income to charitable causes. However, during the 
period of the Coalition Government, this effect falls to 85 per cent, i.e. ൫ߨොଷ + ߶෠ଷ൯. In terms of 
time volunteered, the effect of being aligned to the Conservative Party is also moderated under 
the Coalition Government. 
Following the collapse of the Coalition Government after the May 2015 general 
election, the results reveal that the association between feeling closest to the Conservative 
(Green) Party and the proportion of income donated to charity is dramatically reduced 
compared to the period when the Labour Party was in government. Interestingly, the effect of 
feeling closest to the Conservative Party whilst the Conservatives were in government has a 
negative effect on monetary donations to charity of around 17 percentage points, i.e. ൫ߨොଵ + ߠ෠ଵ൯ = (0.2627 െ 0.4354) = െ0.173. The findings for monetary donations after the 
collapse of the Coalition Government contrast with those found when considering the amount 
of time volunteered. During the period of the Labour Government, there was no influence of 
alignment to the Green Party (relative to feeling closest to the Labour Party) on hours 
volunteered. However, post-election after the Liberal Democrats lost their place in government, 
the effect of alignment with the Green Party becomes statistically significant increasing time 
volunteered by around 56 per cent, i.e. exp൫ߨොଷ + ߠ෠ଷ൯. Interestingly, the analysis of Table 7 
reveals that the only time that political alignment to the Liberal Democrat Party has an 
influence on donations of time and money is during the period of the Labour Government and, 
perhaps surprisingly, not during the period of the Coalition Government. 
5. Conclusion 
We have explored how political ideology influences donations of time and money, after 
conditioning on a wide range of covariates. As far as we are aware, this is the first paper for 
the UK to explore this issue, as well as being the first in the literature to employ longitudinal 
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data. The small existing literature based on evidence for the U.S. has revealed conflicting 
evidence, with Brooks (2005) reporting that conservatives donate more than liberals, whilst 
Yen and Zampelli (2014) find the opposite result, and Luccasen et al. (2017) find no 
relationship between giving and political ideology. Our analysis, which is robust to using a 
number of estimation strategies, reveals that being affiliated to the Liberal Democrats has a 
greater effect on charitable behaviour than being affiliated to the Conservatives. Interestingly, 
affiliation with the Green Party relative to having no affiliation generally has the largest effect 
on donations of time and money.  However, the extent of the association between monetary 
donations as a proportion of income and alignment to the Green Party was substantially 
moderated during the period of the UK Coalition Government and its successor the 
Conservative Government (after the Coalition Government collapsed), relative to the period of 
when the Labour Party was in power.  
Given the fundamentally important role that charities play in supporting a vast range of 
national and international causes, understanding what drives people to make charitable 
donations is an important area of research. Such considerations may also influence the policy 
agenda in terms of, for example, fiscal policy and tax relief, when considering monetary 
donations. This is also apparent when considering the supply of unpaid labour, i.e. time 
donations. Prior to the 2015 UK general election, the government had intended that such 
activity should be recognised by amending the Working Time Regulations to entitle people to 
28 days of paid vacation and 3 days of paid volunteering, although subsequently after the 
election and the change in Government, this pledge was not met. Clearly, understanding what 
influences volunteering and donating behaviour at the individual level is important, given the 
contribution of donations of time and money to the UK economy. For example, unpaid 
volunteering has recently been estimated at £25.6 billion (ONS, 2013) and monetary donations 
to charity are approximately 0.7% of annual GDP (Charities Aid Foundation, 2016b). We hope 
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that our empirical findings will stimulate further research into the motivations behind charitable 
behaviour. 
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FIGURE 1: Charitable donations (donators only) as a proportion of total income 
 
FIGURE 2: Number of hours volunteered (volunteers only) 
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TABLE 1A: Summary statistics dependent variables 
   
PANEL A: Charitable donation as a proportion of annual income, ݀݋݊௜௧  
  
 
MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Charitable donations over past 12 months (£) 160.909 496.08 0 11,546 
Charitable donations as a proportion of annual income (%) 1.004 4.13 0 10 
OBSERVATIONS  62,228 
 
MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX IF NOT EQUAL TO ZERO 
Charitable donations over past 12 months (£) 235.26 585.08 1 11,546 
Charitable donations as a proportion of annual income (%) 1.468 4.93 0.001 10 
OBSERVATIONS (% non-zero) 42,562 (68.40%) 
PANEL B: Number of hours volunteered, ݒ݋݈௜௧    
 
MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Number of hours volunteered during past 4 weeks 2.389 9.97 0 200 
OBSERVATIONS 62,228 
 
MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX IF NOT EQUAL TO ZERO 
Number of hours volunteered during past 4 weeks 15.038 20.88 1 200 
OBSERVATIONS (% non-zero) 9,884 (15.88%) 
TABLE 1B: Summary statistics explanatory variables, ࢄ௜௧ 
   
 
MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Aged 16-24 0.0789 0.2697 0 1 
Aged 25-34 0.1450 0.3521 0 1 
Aged 35-44 0.1946 0.3959 0 1 
Aged 45-54 0.1972 0.3979 0 1 
Aged 55-64 0.1668 0.3728 0 1 
Male 0.4398 0.4964 0 1 
Number of children aged 2 or under 0.1014 0.3387 0 6 
Number of children aged 3-4 0.0726 0.2726 0 3 
Number of children aged 5-11 0.2523 0.5944 0 7 
Number of children aged 12-15 0.1468 0.4166 0 5 
Number of adults in household 2.1936 0.9724 0 12 
Married or cohabiting 0.5509 0.4974 0 1 
GCSE 0.1867 0.3897 0 1 
A level 0.0777 0.2677 0 1 
Degree 0.2389 0.4264 0 1 
Other higher qualification 0.0894 0.2978 0 1 
Employee 0.5151 0.4997 0 1 
Self employed 0.0812 0.2732 0 1 
Unemployed 0.0390 0.1937 0 1 
Home owned outright 0.3309 0.4705 0 1 
Home owned on a mortgage 0.3980 0.4895 0 1 
Home privately rented 0.0807 0.2723 0 1 
White British 0.5423 0.4982 0 1 
Frequency of attending religious services 0.1888 0.3907 0 1 
Church of England 0.2622 0.4398 0 1 
Roman Catholic 0.0745 0.2625 0 1 
Christian 0.0375 0.1901 0 1 
Muslim 0.0440 0.2050 0 1 
Other religion 0.0928 0.2902 0 1 
Health excellent 0.1525 0.3595 0 1 
Health good 0.6193 0.4856 0 1 
Health fair 0.1273 0.3333 0 1 
Word recall 0 1 -3.6995 2.1631 
Numeric ability 0 1 -3.2334 1.2505 
Verbal fluency 0 1 -3.1236 8.3020 
Agreeableness 0 1 -4.4689 1.3164 
Conscientiousness 0 1 -4.0293 1.3723 
Extraversion 0 1 -2.7537 1.8498 
Neuroticism 0 1 -1.7762 2.3908 
Openness to experience 0 1 -2.6985 1.8743 
Natural logarithm of monthly labour income 4.5914 3.6460 0 9.7667 
Natural logarithm of monthly non-labour income 4.5647 2.9137 0 9.7667 
Natural logarithm of monthly savings 2.0942 2.5833 0 11.3015 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
TABLE 1C: Summary statistics – political explanatory variables, ࡼ࡭௜௧ 
 
MEAN STD. DEV. ߩଵ ߩଶ 
which political party closest to 
    
Conservative 0.2502 0.4331 0.0333* 0.0311* 
Labour 0.2675 0.4427 0.0019* -0.0102* 
Liberal democrat 0.0635 0.2438 0.0268* 0.0412* 
Green party 0.0168 0.1286 0.0201* 0.0160* 
No party stated (reference category) 0.4020 0.4902 -0.0496* -0.0429* 
political party closest to & strength of support 
    
Conservative very strong support 0.0162 0.1266 0.0066* 0.0117* 
Conservative fairly strong support 0.0900 0.2862 0.0196* 0.0277* 
Conservative not very strong support 0.1437 0.3508 0.0225* 0.0116* 
Labour very strong support 0.0287 0.1670 -0.0038* 0.0154* 
Labour fairly strong support 0.0978 0.2970 0.0054* -0.0102* 
Labour not very strong support 0.1408 0.3478 -0.0004* -0.0115* 
Liberal very strong support 0.0022 0.0472 0.0090* 0.0127* 
Liberal fairly strong support 0.0157 0.1244 0.0198* 0.0277* 
Liberal not very strong support 0.0455 0.2084 0.0175* 0.0287* 
Green party very strong support 0.0010 0.0321 0.0011* 0.0132* 
Green party fairly strong support 0.0071 0.0839 0.0155* 0.0140* 
Green party not very strong support 0.0087 0.0928 0.0135* 0.0050* 
level of interest in politics 
    
Very interested 0.1164 0.3207 0.0329* 0.0536* 
Fairly interested 0.3714 0.4832 0.0356* 0.0299* 
Not very interested 0.2792 0.4486 -0.0079* -0.0287* 
Not at all interested (reference category) 0.2330 0.4228 -0.2001* -0.4237* 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
 
MEAN STD. DEV. ߩଵ ߩଶ 
political party would vote for tomorrow 
    
Conservative 0.1634 0.3697 0.0262* 0.0179* 
Labour 0.2278 0.4194 -0.0005* -0.0360* 
Liberal democrat 0.0840 0.2765 0.0363* 0.0223* 
Green party 0.0653 0.2471 0.0100* 0.0191* 
No party stated (reference category) 0.4601 0.4984 -0.0441* -0.0048* 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 15,355 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 24,882 
Notes: (i) ߩଵ (ߩଶ) are pairwise correlation coefficients between each of the political variables and charitable donation as a proportion 
of annual income (number of hours volunteered); (ii) * denotes statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
TABLE 2: Modelling charitable donations as a proportion of total income and hours volunteered 
 
DONATION y ANNUAL 
INCOME 
HOURS 
VOLUNTEERED 
 
ME  t-stat  
 
COEF  t-stat  
Aged 16-24 -0.6570  6.68  -0.3318  4.18  
Aged 25-34 -0.2747  3.29  -0.4831  7.13  
Aged 35-44 -0.0073  0.09  -0.3567  5.74  
Aged 45-54 0.0656  0.91  -0.1633  2.97  
Aged 55-64 0.1448  2.44  -0.1008  2.35  
Male -0.5183  13.19  -0.1760  5.58  
Number of children aged 2 or under -0.0002  0.01  -0.5409  10.70  
Number of children aged 3-4 -0.0797  1.41  -0.0657  1.35  
Number of children aged 5-11 0.0028  1.09  0.1232  5.04  
Number of children aged 12-15 0.0201  1.51  0.0958  3.19  
Number of adults in household -0.0235  1.20  -0.0243  1.48  
Married or cohabiting 0.2960  7.40  0.1172  3.53  
GCSE 0.2477  4.79  0.1882  4.33  
A level 0.5378  7.50  0.3045  5.30  
Degree 0.5587  10.50  0.5518  13.30  
Other higher qualification 0.2912  4.52  0.4105  8.09  
Employee 0.3138  3.84  -0.2531  4.25  
Self employed 0.7391  8.22  0.1430  2.26  
Unemployed -0.3120  3.43  -0.0100  0.14  
Home owned outright 0.5839  10.61  0.3238  7.29  
Home owned on a mortgage 0.5218  10.60  0.1559  3.77  
Home privately rented -0.3736  5.11  -0.2018  2.95  
White British 0.1780  3.13  0.1082  2.36  
Frequency of attending religious services 0.8953  18.60  0.7366  21.37  
Church of England 0.1212  2.67  0.2088  5.72  
Roman Catholic 0.1227  1.73  -0.0173  0.29  
Christian 0.6995  7.42  0.5409  8.16  
Muslim 0.7986  8.14  -0.0516  0.59  
Other religion 0.4414  6.57  0.3011  6.05  
Health excellent 0.4953  7.62  0.4263  7.86  
Health good 0.4672  8.68  0.3730  7.90  
Health fair 0.2573  4.03  0.2091  3.80  
Word recall 0.1385  6.64  0.0891  5.28  
Numeric ability 0.2891  13.75  0.1949  11.39  
Verbal fluency 0.1541  7.53  0.1238  7.58  
Agreeableness 0.0426  2.24  -0.0269  1.71  
Conscientiousness -0.0317  1.84  -0.0367  2.35  
Extraversion 0.0561  3.01  0.0824  5.49  
Neuroticism 0.0324  1.72  -0.0124  0.81  
Openness to experience 0.0955  4.93  0.1144  7.23  
Natural logarithm of monthly labour income -0.2617  22.68  -0.0236  2.93  
Natural logarithm of monthly non-labour income -0.1451  20.13  0.0233  3.97  
Natural logarithm of monthly savings 0.0894  14.39  0.0284  6.07  
which political party closest to         
Conservative 0.3681  8.50  0.2022  5.89  
Labour 0.3233  7.97  0.1692  5.05  
Liberal democrat 0.4779  7.19  0.2973  6.33  
Green party 0.7276  6.17  0.4340  5.46  
Wald ߯ଶ(58); p-value 4,615.88; p=0.000 3,724.82; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
Notes: (i) other controls include region and year dummies; (ii) charitable donations as a proportion of income are estimated via a tobit 
model with random effects where the table reports marginal effects (ME); (iii) the number of hours volunteered are modelled as a 
count outcome with random effects where the table reports coefficients (COEF).
TABLE 3: Modelling charitable donations as a proportion of total income and hours volunteered – allowing 
for dynamics 
 
DONATION y ANNUAL 
INCOME 
HOURS 
VOLUNTEERED 
 
ME  t-stat  
 
COEF  t-stat  
Lagged dependent variable 0.0516  5.44  0.0167  14.03  
which political party closest to         
Conservative 0.2431  4.39  0.1352  3.56  
Labour 0.3354  6.53  0.1608  4.28  
Liberal democrat 0.3394  3.64  0.2444  4.41  
Green party 0.7017  4.86  0.5363  6.51  
Wald ߯ଶ(85); p-value 4,218.40; p=0.000 6,575.46; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 20,208 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 32,558 
Notes: (i) other controls as in Table 2 and the mean of time varying covariates; (ii) charitable donations as a proportion of income are 
estimated via a tobit model with random effects where the table reports marginal effects (ME); (iii) the number of hours volunteered 
are modelled as a count outcome with random effects where the table reports coefficients (COEF).
TABLE 4: Modelling charitable donations as a proportion of total income and hours volunteered 
PANEL A: Strength of support for stated 
political parted 
DONATION y ANNUAL 
INCOME 
HOURS 
VOLUNTEERED 
ME  t-stat  
 
COEF  t-stat  
political party closest to & strength of support         
Conservative very strong support 0.2636  2.17  0.2079  2.38  
Conservative fairly strong support 0.3611  6.68  0.1865  4.18  
Conservative not very strong support 0.3946  7.36  0.2183  5.72  
Labour very strong support 0.2391  2.51  0.2961  4.32  
Labour fairly strong support 0.3566  6.38  0.1740  3.87  
Labour not very strong support 0.3151  6.59  0.1485  3.77  
Liberal very strong support 0.7957  2.54  0.8920  5.27  
Liberal fairly strong support 0.5910  4.97  0.4212  5.50  
Liberal not very strong support 0.4295  5.77  0.2305  4.39  
Green party very strong support 0.7061  1.60  0.5093  2.11  
Green party fairly strong support 0.9034  5.16  0.4919  4.48  
Green party not very strong support 0.5955  3.83  0.3795  3.48  
Wald ߯ଶ(65); p-value 4,622.03; p=0.000 3,752.63; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
PANEL B: Party would vote for tomorrow 
DONATION y ANNUAL 
INCOME 
HOURS 
VOLUNTEERED 
ME  t-stat  
 
COEF  t-stat  
political party would vote for tomorrow         
Conservative 0.3367  5.72  0.0277  0.44  
Labour 0.2034  3.77  -0.1258  1.99  
Liberal democrat 0.5171  6.91  0.3121  4.13  
Green party 0.3977  4.76  0.4315  5.15  
Wald ߯ଶ(58); p-value 1,975.18; p=0.000 1,423.23; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 15,355 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 24,882 
Notes: (i) other controls as in Table 2; (ii) charitable donations as a proportion of income are estimated via a tobit model with random 
effects where the table reports marginal effects (ME); (iii) the number of hours volunteered are modelled as a count outcome with 
random effects where the table reports coefficients (COEF); (iv) Panel B is based upon a sub-sample of individuals who do not support 
a particular political party and who are not closer to one political party than others.   
 
 
TABLE 4 (cont.): Modelling charitable donations as a proportion of total income and hours volunteered 
PANEL C: Level of interest in politics 
DONATION y ANNUAL 
INCOME 
HOURS 
VOLUNTEERED 
ME  t-stat  
 
COEF  t-stat  
level of interest in politics         
Very interested 0.8178  13.42  0.6063  12.76  
Fairly interested 0.6485  14.40  0.3565  9.05  
Not very interested 0.4145  9.38  0.2090  5.25  
Wald ߯ଶ(58); p-value 4,727.38; p=0.000 3,826.05; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
PANEL D: Level of interest in politics and 
political party closest to 
DONATION y ANNUAL 
INCOME 
HOURS 
VOLUNTEERED 
ME  t-stat  
 
COEF  t-stat  
political party closest to × political interest         
Conservative × very interested 0.6017  6.93  0.3501  5.83  
Conservative × fairly interested 0.3970  7.68  0.2175  5.49  
Conservative × not very interested 0.2998  4.85  0.1877  3.94  
Labour × very interested 0.5573  7.40  0.5402  10.28  
Labour × fairly interested 0.3585  7.10  0.1581  3.87  
Labour × not very interested 0.1829  2.97  0.0108  0.20  
Liberal × very interested 0.6336  4.13  0.5706  6.21  
Liberal × fairly interested 0.6058  6.86  0.3390  5.71  
Liberal × not very interested 0.3610  3.31  0.2518  3.22  
Green party × very interested 1.0321  4.39  0.5805  4.17  
Green party × fairly interested 0.8646  5.30  0.4843  4.54  
Green party × not very interested 0.3651  1.60  0.3685  2.18  
Wald ߯ଶ(67); p-value 4,669.55; p=0.000 3,859.12; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
Notes: (i) other controls as in Table 2; (ii) charitable donations as a proportion of income are estimated via a tobit model with random 
effects where the table reports marginal effects (ME); (iii) the number of hours volunteered are modelled as a count outcome with 
random effects where the table reports coefficients (COEF).
TABLE 5: Hurdle model of charitable donations as a proportion of total income 
PANEL A: Political party closest to (1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
Conservative 0.2131 13.53  0.2327 15.49 0.0767 15.62  0.1549 8.87 
Labour 0.1854 12.57  0.2241 16.22 0.0740 16.36  0.1280 7.61 
Liberal democrat 0.3508 12.05  0.2930 11.78 0.0951 12.41  0.2696 9.99 
Green party 0.7884 10.37  0.3292 7.16 0.1059 7.76  0.6005 12.36 
Wald ߯ଶ(49); p-value 15,250.92; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 0.1922 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
PANEL B: Strength of support for stated 
political parted 
(1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
Conservative very strong support 0.2911 6.22  0.1992 4.42 0.0640 4.43  0.2525 4.99 
Conservative fairly strong support 0.2356 10.58  0.2498 11.60 0.0803 11.63  0.1662 6.93 
Conservative not very strong support 0.2025 10.77  0.2259 12.71 0.0726 12.76  0.1379 6.79 
Labour very strong support 0.2431 6.64  0.2300 6.79 0.0740 6.80  0.1834 4.60 
Labour fairly strong support 0.2253 10.47  0.2350 11.85 0.0756 11.89  0.1605 6.88 
Labour not very strong support 0.1605 8.58  0.2144 12.60 0.0689 12.64  0.0941 4.62 
Liberal very strong support 0.5455 4.41  0.1449 1.22 0.0466 1.22  0.5715 4.27 
Liberal fairly strong support 0.4303 9.29  0.3902 8.03 0.1255 8.05  0.3319 6.73 
Liberal not very strong support 0.3011 10.42  0.2670 9.46 0.0868 9.47  0.2335 7.54 
Green party very strong support 0.8133 4.67  0.7017 3.24 0.2256 3.24  0.6428 3.58 
Green party fairly strong support 0.6826 9.94  0.3748 5.31 0.1205 5.31  0.6317 8.65 
Green party not very strong support 0.5852 9.32  0.2589 4.19 0.0832 4.19  0.5685 8.45 
Wald ߯ଶ(57); p-value 15,284.98; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
PANEL C: Party would vote for tomorrow (1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
Conservative 0.1584 7.21  0.2498 10.00 0.0885 10.13  0.1174 3.80 
Labour 0.0801 4.28  0.1697 7.79 0.0607 7.86  0.0398 1.36 
Liberal democrat 0.2308 7.44  0.3103 9.49 0.1091 9.72  0.1867 4.77 
Green party 0.2866 7.76  0.3312 9.11 0.1160 9.47  0.2470 5.69 
Wald ߯ଶ(49); p-value 6,199.43; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 15,355 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 24,882 
TABLE 5 (cont.): Hurdle model of charitable donations as a proportion of total income 
PANEL D: Level of interest in politics (1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
Very interested 0.5675 21.85  0.4519 21.10 0.1490 21.89  0.4464 18.03 
Fairly interested 0.3285 21.70  0.3778 24.97 0.1267 24.47  0.2483 12.96 
Not very interested 0.1825 12.38  0.2349 15.49 0.0811 15.38  0.1407 7.08 
Wald ߯ଶ(48); p-value 15,887.29; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
PANEL E: Level of interest in politics and political 
party closest to 
(1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
political party closest to × political interest           
Conservative × very interested 0.4231 13.03  0.3716 11.13 0.1191 11.16  0.3325 9.65 
Conservative × fairly interested 0.2286 11.82  0.2658 14.17 0.0852 14.23  0.1519 7.31 
Conservative × not very interested 0.1558 6.49  0.1475 6.51 0.0473 6.51  0.1179 4.53 
Labour × very interested 0.4305 15.32  0.3302 11.96 0.1058 12.00  0.3588 12.02 
Labour × fairly interested 0.2270 11.82  0.2809 15.55 0.0900 15.64  0.1437 6.92 
Labour × not very interested 0.0875 3.56  0.1492 6.81 0.0478 6.82  0.0380 1.41 
Liberal × very interested 0.6543 11.12  0.4366 6.93 0.1399 6.94  0.5730 9.23 
Liberal × fairly interested 0.3888 11.46  0.3305 9.44 0.1059 9.46  0.3103 8.60 
Liberal × not very interested 0.1972 4.64  0.2177 5.24 0.0698 5.24  0.1360 2.96 
Green party × very interested 0.7832 8.56  0.4639 4.73 0.1487 4.73  0.7111 7.33 
Green party × fairly interested 0.6629 10.28  0.3812 5.70 0.1222 5.71  0.6067 8.87 
Green party × not very interested 0.5020 5.53  0.2627 2.91 0.0842 2.91  0.4706 4.81 
Wald ߯ଶ(57); p-value 15,787.44; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
Notes: (i) other controls as in Table 2, with the exception that monetary variables (labour income, non-labour income and saving) enter the outcome equation only and cognitive and non-
cognitive (i.e. the Big Five personality traits) enter the hurdle equation only; (ii) column (1) shows the overall average marginal effects (AMEs); column (2) shows the coefficients in the 
selection equation and the AMEs which show the impact upon the probability of donating; and column (3) shows the coefficients on the amount donated, conditional on donating. 
 
TABLE 6: Hurdle model of number of hours volunteered 
PANEL A: Political party closest to (1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
Conservative 0.1108 1.10  0.1107 5.40 0.0242 5.33  -0.1080 3.48 
Labour 0.0149 0.15  0.0952 4.86 0.0206 4.81  -0.1284 4.12 
Liberal democrat 0.7294 4.21  0.2470 8.22 0.0573 7.63  -0.0548 1.22 
Green party 0.7130 2.38  0.2930 5.75 0.0694 5.16  -0.1183 1.57 
Wald ߯ଶ(49); p-value 416.96; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
PANEL B: Strength of support for stated 
political parted 
(1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
Conservative very strong support 0.2977 1.14  0.1051 1.94 0.0233 1.94  -0.0176 0.21 
Conservative fairly strong support 0.1895 1.41  0.1163 4.25 0.0258 4.25  -0.0796 1.94 
Conservative not very strong support 0.0460 0.41  0.1106 4.77 0.0245 4.77  -0.1333 3.85 
Labour very strong support 0.6313 2.93  0.2474 5.78 0.0548 5.78  -0.0713 1.11 
Labour fairly strong support -0.1641 1.25  0.0892 3.36 0.0198 3.36  -0.1939 4.71 
Labour not very strong support 0.0139 0.12  0.0697 3.00 0.0155 3.00  -0.0905 2.48 
Liberal very strong support 2.1709 4.43  0.6527 4.95 0.1447 4.95  0.0287 0.28 
Liberal fairly strong support 0.8491 3.65  0.3241 6.32 0.0719 6.33  -0.0840 1.17 
Liberal not very strong support 0.5166 3.07  0.1955 5.82 0.0433 5.82  -0.0487 0.92 
Green party very strong support 1.8231 2.05  0.5218 2.87 0.1157 2.87  0.0605 0.23 
Green party fairly strong support 1.0199 2.84  0.3609 4.80 0.0800 4.80  -0.0616 0.58 
Green party not very strong support 0.1983 0.63  0.2100 3.16 0.0465 3.16  -0.2053 2.07 
Wald ߯ଶ(57); p-value 430.88; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
PANEL C: Party would vote for tomorrow (1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
Conservative -0.0265 0.18  0.0366 1.10 0.0065 1.09  -0.0712 1.25 
Labour -0.4498 3.60  -0.0596 1.82 -0.0101 1.84  -0.1798 3.18 
Liberal democrat 0.2460 1.27  0.1560 3.82 0.0297 3.64  -0.1130 1.67 
Green party 0.3166 1.47  0.1898 4.21 0.0368 3.94  -0.1294 1.73 
Wald ߯ଶ(49); p-value 226.28; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 15,355 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 24,882 
TABLE 6 (cont.): Hurdle model of number of hours volunteered 
PANEL D: Level of interest in politics (1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
Very interested 0.8823 5.60  0.3382 13.53 0.0881 13.02  -0.1849 4.19 
Fairly interested 0.2245 1.98  0.1973 8.93 0.0416 9.20  -0.1858 4.93 
Not very interested -0.0473 0.43  0.1129 5.17 0.0228 5.23  -0.1892 4.93 
Wald ߯ଶ(48); p-value 432.19; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
PANEL E: Level of interest in politics and political 
party closest to 
(1) OVERALL  (2) HURDLE  (3) OUTCOME 
AME tstat  COEF tstat AME (pr=1) tstat  COEF tstat 
political party closest to × political interest           
Conservative × very interested 0.5592 3.08  0.2364 6.15 0.0523 6.15  -0.0863 1.58 
Conservative × fairly interested 0.0795 0.67  0.1213 5.00 0.0268 4.99  -0.1334 3.68 
Conservative × not very interested 0.1169 0.82  0.1020 3.50 0.0225 3.50  -0.0906 2.11 
Labour × very interested 0.7854 4.82  0.3480 10.27 0.0769 10.27  -0.1433 3.00 
Labour × fairly interested -0.0638 0.53  0.0827 3.42 0.0183 3.42  -0.1416 3.76 
Labour × not very interested -0.2981 1.90  0.0023 0.07 0.0005 0.07  -0.1311 2.62 
Liberal × very interested 1.4428 5.00  0.4710 7.20 0.1041 7.20  -0.0311 0.36 
Liberal × fairly interested 0.8398 4.43  0.2752 7.02 0.0609 7.02  -0.0195 0.33 
Liberal × not very interested 0.3089 1.24  0.1884 3.88 0.0417 3.88  -0.1275 1.65 
Green party × very interested 1.5527 3.25  0.4674 4.76 0.1033 4.76  0.0211 0.15 
Green party × fairly interested 0.5535 1.66  0.3392 4.96 0.0750 4.96  -0.2308 2.33 
Green party × not very interested 0.2775 0.60  0.1657 1.60 0.0366 1.59  -0.1096 0.74 
Wald ߯ଶ(57); p-value 426.94; p=0.000 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 28,142 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 62,228 
Notes: (i) other controls as in Table 2, with the exception that monetary variables (labour income, non-labour income and saving) enter the outcome equation only and cognitive and non-
cognitive (i.e. the Big Five personality traits) enter the hurdle equation only; (ii) column (1) shows the overall average marginal effects (AMEs); column (2) shows the coefficients in the 
selection equation and the AMEs which show the impact upon the probability of volunteering; and column (3) shows the coefficients on the number of hours volunteered, conditional on 
volunteering. 
 TABLE 7: Modelling charitable donations as a proportion of total income and hours volunteered – the 
effect of changes in government. 
 
DONATION y ANNUAL 
INCOME 
HOURS 
VOLUNTEERED 
 
ME  t-stat  
 
COEF  t-stat  
         
which political party closest to         
Conservative (ܲܣଵ) 0.2627  1.26  0.3039  2.57  
Liberal democrat (ܲܣଶ) 0.5066  2.21  0.2265  2.46  
Green party (ܲܣଷ) 1.8162  4.06  -0.3304  0.80  
         
interactions         ܲܣଵ × ܿ݋݈ܽ݅ݐ݅݋݊ -0.0780  0.46  -0.2296  1.92  ܲܣଶ × ܿ݋݈ܽ݅ݐ݅݋݊ -0.2977  1.25  -0.0013  0.01  ܲܣଷ × ܿ݋݈ܽ݅ݐ݅݋݊ -0.9631  3.55  0.7036  1.67  ܲܣଵ × ܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݎݒܽݐ݅ݒ݁ -0.4354  1.94  -0.4259  2.76  ܲܣଶ × ܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݎݒܽݐ݅ݒ݁ -0.4485  1.26  -0.2518  1.13  ܲܣଷ × ܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݎݒܽݐ݅ݒ݁ -1.0774  2.69  0.7751  2.68  
         
which political party in government         ܿ݋݈ܽ݅ݐ݅݋݊ -0.0484  0.36  0.2712  2.75  ܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݎݒܽݐ݅ݒ݁ 0.1261  0.62  0.2558  1.82  
Wald ߯ଶ(109); p-value 2,605.68; p=0.000 2,328.45; p=0.000 ܪ଴:ߨଵ = ߶ଵ = 0; ߯ଶ(2); p-value 6.30; p=0.043 8.92; p=0.012 ܪ଴:ߨଶ = ߶ଶ = 0; ߯ଶ(2); p-value 10.21; p=0.006 18.73; p=0.000 ܪ଴:ߨଷ = ߶ଷ = 0; ߯ଶ(2); p-value 18.19; p=0.000 17.77; p=0.000 ܪ଴:ߨଵ = ߠଵ = 0; ߯ଶ(2); p-value 3.84; p=0.147 8.20; p=0.017 ܪ଴:ߨଶ = ߠଶ = 0; ߯ଶ(2); p-value 4.92; p=0.086 2.17; p=0.337 ܪ଴:ߨଷ = ߠଷ = 0; ߯ଶ(2); p-value 26.94; p=0.000 5.37; p=0.068 
INDIVIDUALS (N) 18,832 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 37,215 
Notes: (i) other controls as in Table 2 with the addition of day of interview, month of interview and year dummies; (ii) charitable 
donations as a proportion of income are estimated via a tobit model with random effects where the table reports marginal effects 
(ME); (iii) the number of hours volunteered are modelled as a count outcome with random effects where the table reports 
coefficients (COEF). 
